FastDDS has Out-of-memory while parsing GenericMessage when DDS Security is enabled

Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group
). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on
going security-control traffic after the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token
delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the message_data (i
.e., the DataHolderSeq) via the readParticipantGenericMessage → readDataHolderSeq path. The DataHolderSeq is parsed
sequentially: a sequence count (uint32), and for each DataHolder the class_id string (e.g. DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req),
string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat
es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s
o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates,
delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n
umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not "peek" only at a minimal
header and instead parses the entire DataHolderSeq. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi
ng behavior can trigger an out-o…