Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107809)
Summary
Vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107809). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via GET /csrf.html. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
Nginx-UI v2.4.3 stores the API JWT in a browser cookie named token and the AuthRequired middleware accepts that cookie as an authentication source. Because management endpoints are protected by AuthRequired and do not enforce a universal CSRF token or Origin/Referer check, a remote attacker can induce a logged-in administrator to submit cross-site state-changing requests. The attacker does not need to read the cross-origin response; the browser-sent cookie is enough to authenticate the request.
Details
The root cause is a trust-boundary failure between browser-managed cookies and API bearer-token authentication. In app/src/pinia/moudule/user.ts:25-35, the front end writes the JWT to a token cookie when the token changes. In internal/middleware/middleware.go:16-36, getToken first checks the Authorization header and token query parameter, then falls back to c.Cookie("token"). That fallback causes browser-initiated cross-site requests to carry a valid API credential automatically. The route group in router/routers.go:87-110 applies middleware.AuthRequired() to many management modules, including config.InitRouter, nginx.InitRouter, settings.InitRouter, and backup-related handlers. For accounts without OTP/Passkey, RequireSecureSession does not provide a universal second factor for all state-changing operations. A representative sink is api/config/add.go:68-78, where an authenticated request writes Nginx configuration with `os.Write…
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-107809 has been found in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /csrf.html over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.8/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI CVE-2026-107809" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-107809 (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI) — CWE-352 / CVSS v3 8.8
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated
Attack surface: GET /csrf.html / POST /api/configs / token / AuthRequired
Patched: 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
CSRF (CWE-352) exists in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /csrf.html without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attack surface: GET /csrf.html / POST /api/configs / token / AuthRequired.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /csrf.html requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /csrf.html' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /csrf.htmlへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3bステージング環境で 1.9.10-0.20260728074433-a3999bd78a3b に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
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4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /csrf.html on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。