Vulnerability in Jexactyl (CVE-2026-107852)
Summary
Vulnerability in Jexactyl (CVE-2026-107852). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Jexactyl is a customisable game management panel and billing system. Prior to 4.0.5, the POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process endpoint accepts a client-supplied Stripe Checkout Session when payment_status is paid but does not compare amount_total or currency with the referenced order and configured billing currency. On an instance where the billing module is enabled and a Stripe secret key is configured, an authenticated client can therefore complete a lower-value or mismatched-currency payment and cause the order to be processed, provisioning, renewing, upgrading, or unsuspending the purchased server for less than the required price. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.5.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-107852 has been found in Jexactyl.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Jexactyl CVE-2026-107852" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-107852 (Jexactyl) — CWE-345
Attack surface: POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (CWE-345) exists in Jexactyl. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Jexactyl. Attack surface: POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'Jexactyl' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'Jexactyl' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
Jexactylを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /api/client/billing/stripe/processへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。