Injection SQL dans thorsten/phpmyfaq (CVE-2026-46359)

Summary

CurrentUser::setTokenData() in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php at lines 515-534 builds a SQL UPDATE statement with sprintf and interpolates OAuth token fields (refresh_token, access_token, code_verifier, and json_encode($token['jwt'])) without calling $db->escape(). Sibling methods setAuthSource() and setRememberMe() in the same file do call $db->escape() on user-controlled values, so the omission is local to this method. An attacker (Bob) whose Azure AD display name contains a single quote (for example O'Brien, or a deliberate SQL payload) breaks out of the string literal and injects arbitrary SQL against the phpMyFAQ database.

Details

Vulnerable code (phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php, lines 513-534):

public function setTokenData(#[\SensitiveParameter] array $token): bool
{
    $update = sprintf(
        "
        UPDATE
            %sfaquser
        SET
            refresh_token = '%s',
            access_token = '%s',
            code_verifier = '%s',
            jwt = '%s'
        WHERE
            user_id = %d",
        Database::getTablePrefix(),
        $token['refresh_token'],
        $token['access_token'],
        $token['code_verifier'],
        json_encode($token['jwt'], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
        $this->getUserId(),
    );

    return (bool) $this->configuration->getDb()->query($update);
}

json_encode() does NOT escape single quotes. A JWT claim such as `{"preferred_username": "…