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CVE-2026-73800

Gitea resolves local reusable workflow files from a fork's head commit when a trusted base-branch workflow runs for a…

Summary

Code injection reported (CVE-2026-73800). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Gitea resolves local reusable workflow files from a fork's head commit when a trusted base-branch workflow runs for a pull_request_target event. A fork author can modify a referenced reusable workflow so attacker-controlled code executes with the repository and organization secrets available to that event. Exploitation requires a base workflow that calls a local reusable workflow, and bypasses the intended separation between trusted base code and untrusted fork code.

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-73800 has been found.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2026-73800" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-73800 — CWE-94
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

Arbitrary code execution (CWE-94) has been reported.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify
    Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.

    資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。

  2. 2
    Post-deployment verification verify
    Confirm patched version is live in production

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

References

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