In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() read...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow: gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf) ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset ec = (ptr + 4) / OOB read on short head */ rrc = (ptr + 6) / OOB read on short head / rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc) xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base) / u32 wrap when base > len / _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift) shift %= buf->len / divide-by-zero when base == len */ After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape: movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len); The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to min(A, B) > A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned underflow of move…