CouchDB administrative users before 2.2.0 can configure the database server via HTTP(S). Due to insufficient validation…
Summary
Vulnerability reported (CVE-2018-11769). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
CouchDB administrative users before 2.2.0 can configure the database server via HTTP(S). Due to insufficient validation of administrator-supplied configuration settings via the HTTP API, it is possible for a CouchDB administrator user to escalate their privileges to that of the operating system's user under which CouchDB runs, by bypassing the blacklist of configuration settings that are not allowed to be modified via the HTTP API. This privilege escalation effectively allows a CouchDB admin user to gain arbitrary remote code execution, bypassing CVE-2017-12636 and CVE-2018-8007.
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2018-11769 has been found.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2018-11769" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2018-11769
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (unclassified) has been reported.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions.
Severity: ?. Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
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1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。
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2Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- advisory securityfocus.com
- advisory security.gentoo.org
- web lists.apache.org
- web lists.fedoraproject.org
- web lists.fedoraproject.org
- web support.hpe.com