Vulnerability in TAXII libtaxii (CVE-2020-27197)

Summary

Vulnerability in TAXII libtaxii (CVE-2020-27197). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

TAXII libtaxii through 1.1.117, as used in EclecticIQ OpenTAXII through 0.2.0 and other products, allows SSRF via an initial http:// substring to the parse method, even when the no_network setting is used for the XML parser. NOTE: the vendor points out that the parse method "wraps the lxml library" and that this may be an issue to "raise ... to the lxml group.

Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2020-27197 has been found in TAXII libtaxii.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "TAXII libtaxii CVE-2020-27197" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2020-27197 (TAXII libtaxii)
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (unclassified) exists in TAXII libtaxii.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of TAXII libtaxii.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

🔧 How to fix

Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

1
Identify exposure identify
```
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.
```
資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで TAXII libtaxii を使っているサービスとバージョンを洗い出す。
2
Post-deployment verification verify
```
Confirm patched version is live in production
```
パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Summary

Original description

Auto-generated summary

Response actions

References