AEADs/aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure
Résumé
AEADs/aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure
Description d'origine
La description telle que publiée par la source (souvent en anglais).
aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 0.10.3, in the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails. If a program using the aes-gcm crate's decrypt_in_place* APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery. Version 0.10.3 contains a fix for this issue.
Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV
Paquets affectés
Références
- advisory rustsec.org
- advisory github.com
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- package crates.io
- web github.com
- web docs.rs
- web lists.fedoraproject.org
- web lists.fedoraproject.org
- web lists.fedoraproject.org