OS Command Injection in Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation (CVE-2023-46359)
Summary
OS command injection in Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation (CVE-2023-46359). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
An OS command injection vulnerability in Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation v1.87.0 and earlier, may allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system via a specifically crafted arguments passed to the connectivity check feature.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-46359 has been found in Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 9.8/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation CVE-2023-46359" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2023-46359 (Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation) — CWE-78 / CVSS v3 9.8
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
OS command injection (CWE-78) exists in Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
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1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで Hardy Barth cPH2 eCharge Ladestation を使っているサービスとバージョンを洗い出す。
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2Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- exploit offensity.com
- web hardy.com