Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker...
Summary
Vulnerability reported (CVE-2026-102711). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via _txm_module_manager_memory_load.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via _txm_module_manager_memory_load / _txm_module_manager_in_place_load — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB read (code_size trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as code_start + preamble_offset with only a != 0 check, and the preamble checksum never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded).
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-102711 has been found.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like _txm_module_manager_memory_load over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2026-102711" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-102711 — CWE-125
Attack surface: _txm_module_manager_memory_load / _txm_module_manager_in_place_load / TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE / code_size
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) has been reported. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via _txm_module_manager_memory_load.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions. Attack surface: _txm_module_manager_memory_load / _txm_module_manager_in_place_load / TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE / code_size.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。
-
2Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- web github.com
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web github.com