When NetX Secure is built with `NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR`, every TLS record sent on an active session...
Summary
Vulnerability reported (CVE-2026-102760). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
When NetX Secure is built with NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR, every TLS record sent on an active session is wiped after it has been handed to TCP. By then the TCP layer owns the packet chain and may already have released it to the packet pool. The wipe therefore writes zeros into packets that are free or in use by another thread, and when a reused packet's pointers no longer describe the old data, the length of the wipe underflows and it runs past the end of the packet pool.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-102760 has been found.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2026-102760" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-102760 — CWE-416
Attack surface: NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Use-after-free (CWE-416) has been reported. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions. Attack surface: NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。
-
2Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- web github.com
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web github.com