Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in quasar (CVE-2026-106102)
Summary
Cross-site scripting in quasar (CVE-2026-106102). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via POST /submit. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.22.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Vulnerability Details
File: ui/src/utils/meta/Meta.js — actually ui/src/plugins/meta/Meta.js (lines 149-176: getAttr() and getHead())
Sink: injectServerMeta() (same file) → ctx.headTags += getHead(data), interpolated verbatim into the raw HTTP response `` by the production SSR template (app-vite/templates/entry/ssr-prod-webserver.js + app-vite/lib/plugins/vite.html.js)
Entry point: the public useMeta() composable (ui/src/composables/use-meta/use-meta.js) — the single documented way apps set page title/meta/link/script tags
Root Cause
getHead() is Quasar's SSR-only serializer that turns the meta/link/script/title data collected from every useMeta() call into a literal HTML string, using plain template-literal interpolation with zero HTML-entity escaping and zero attribute-quote escaping:
function getAttr(seed) {
return att => {
const val = seed[att]
return att + (val !== true && val !== void 0 ? `="${val}"` : '')
}
}
function getHead(meta) {
let output = ''
if (meta.title) {
output += `${meta.title}`
}
...
}
Contrast this with the client-side equivalent, apply() (same file, used only in the browser post-hydration), which builds the same tags via document.createElement(...) + tag.setAttribute(att, val) — the browser DOM API automatically escapes attribute values, so the client-side path is not vulnerable. getHead() is a separate, parallel implementation for the SSR case that never…
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-106102 has been found in quasar.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /submit over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 10.0/10.
What to do: upgrade quasar to 2.22.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "quasar CVE-2026-106102" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-106102 (quasar) — CWE-79 / CVSS v3 10.0
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /submit / GET /render/1 / title / document.cookie
Patched: 2.22.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) (CWE-79) exists in quasar. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /submit without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of quasar. Attack surface: POST /submit / GET /render/1 / title / document.cookie.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.
Update to 2.22.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /submit requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'quasar' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'quasar' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
quasarを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /submit' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /submitへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade quasar to 2.22.0ステージング環境で 2.22.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /submit on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web github.com