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CVE-2026-107282

Vulnerability in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client (CVE-2026-107282)

Summary

Vulnerability in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client (CVE-2026-107282). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via ResponseFilter. Mitigation: upgrade to 3.0.13 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Impact

When a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host.

A replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a ResponseFilter that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design.

  • The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's Authorization header goes to B.
  • Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's Host, and A's Authorization. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs.
  • The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of its own. The cross-origin redirect path strips realms for exactly this reason; the replay path never did.
  • The stale value also decides whether TLS is used at all. When the original request was http:// and the replay is https://, no SSL handler is installed and the replayed request, credentials i…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-107282 has been found in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like ResponseFilter over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to 3.0.13 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client CVE-2026-107282" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-107282 (org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client) — CWE-319
Attack surface: ResponseFilter / Authorization / Host / setCurrentRequest
Patched: 3.0.13 — apply immediately
Workaround: Do not use a ResponseFilter that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy.
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-319) exists in org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via ResponseFilter.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Attack surface: ResponseFilter / Authorization / Host / setCurrentRequest.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 3.0.13.

🛡️ Workaround

Workaround: Do not use a ResponseFilter that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.

    資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client を使っているサービスとバージョンを洗い出す。

  2. 2
    Apply temporary workaround mitigate 
    Do not use a `ResponseFilter` that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy.

    パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、Do not use a ResponseFilter that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy. を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to 3.0.13

    ステージング環境で 3.0.13 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Confirm patched version is live in production

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.0.0"},{"fixed":"2.16.1"}]}]

References

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