Authentication Bypass in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107808)
Summary
Authentication bypass in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107808). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via POST /api/login. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods — TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys —
and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when either is configured. However, the
password login endpoint (POST /api/login) only enforces a second factor when a
TOTP secret is present. An account that has registered a passkey but no
TOTP is logged in after password verification alone — the passkey is never
requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor
(password-only) authentication.
Details
The account's 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (model/user.go):
func (u *User) EnabledOTP() bool { return len(u.OTPSecret) != 0 }
func (u *User) EnabledPasskey() bool { /* true if a passkey row exists */ }
func (u *User) Enabled2FA() bool { return u.EnabledOTP() || u.EnabledPasskey() }
func (u *User) AfterFind(_ *gorm.DB) error {
u.EnabledTwoFA = u.Enabled2FA() // exposed to the UI as `enabled_2fa`
return nil
}
But the login handler only checks EnabledOTP() (api/user/auth.go, Login):
u, err := user.Login(json.Name, json.Password)
...
if u.EnabledOTP() { // <-- only TOTP is enforced
if json.OTP == "" && json.RecoveryCode == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{Message: "The user has enabled 2FA", Code: Enabled2FA}) // 199
user.BanIP(clientIP)
return
}
if _, err = user.VerifyOTP(u, json.OTP, json.RecoveryCode); err != nil { /* ... */ }…
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-107808 has been found in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/login over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.1/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI CVE-2026-107808" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-107808 (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI) — CWE-287 / CVSS v3 8.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/login / GET /api/2fa_status / enabled_2fa / Login
Patched: 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Authentication bypass (CWE-287) exists in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/login without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attack surface: POST /api/login / GET /api/2fa_status / enabled_2fa / Login.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/login requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /api/login' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /api/loginへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814ステージング環境で 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /api/login on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。