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CVE-2026-107812 high CVSS 7.5

Vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107812)

Summary

Vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-107812). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via POST /api/settings. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

The self-upgrade downloads the release binary and its checksum (*.tar.gz and *.tar.gz.digest)
through the SAME endpoint (version.GetUrl(), which is github_proxy or, by default, the project's
cloud.nginxui.com mirror), and verifies the binary ONLY by comparing it to that digest:
digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName). Both the binary and the digest come from the same
origin, and there is NO cryptographic signature / public-key verification. The downloaded binary then
replaces the running executable (selfupdate.CommitBinary) and the process restarts, so the binary
runs as the nginx-ui user (typically root).

Because integrity rests only on a digest fetched from the same place as the binary, anyone who
controls that download path can substitute a malicious binary plus a matching digest and obtain code
execution as root on the next upgrade. Additionally, the github_proxy setting accepts http://
URLs, so the binary+digest can be fetched over cleartext.

Affected code

  • internal/version/url.go GetUrl(path) = / — used for
    BOTH the binary and the digest.
  • internal/upgrader/upgrade.go DownloadLatestRelease: digest URL and binary URL are both wrapped
    with GetUrl(), fetched, and checked with digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName). No
    signature verification anywhere in internal/upgrader/.
  • selfupdate.CommitBinary then replaces the running binary; the process restarts.
  • settings/http.go: GithubProxy accepts any URL (`bindi…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-107812 has been found in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/settings over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 7.5/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI CVE-2026-107812" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-107812 (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI) — CWE-494 / CVSS v3 7.5
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated
Attack surface: POST /api/settings / GET /api/upgrade/perform / GET /https / github_proxy
Patched: 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-494) exists in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/settings without authentication.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. Attack surface: POST /api/settings / GET /api/upgrade/perform / GET /https / github_proxy.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 7.5/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/settings requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/settings' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/settings への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8

    ステージング環境で 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/settings on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1"},{"fixed":"1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8"}]}]

References

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