In zenml-io/zenml version 0.94.2, the `GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack` endpoint (...
Summary
Vulnerability reported (CVE-2026-11876). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
In zenml-io/zenml version 0.94.2, the GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack endpoint (get_deployed_stack) lacks proper RBAC authorization checks, allowing any authenticated user to enumerate all deployed stacks across all users and tenants. This includes stack component details, service connector information, and user IDs of stack owners. The vulnerability arises from two issues: missing endpoint-level RBAC checks and the use of a server-side Client() that bypasses the RBAC enforcement layer by directly accessing the database through SqlZenStore. This exposes sensitive information such as infrastructure topology, service connector details, stack ownership, and deployment metadata, potentially enabling cross-tenant reconnaissance and further attacks in multi-tenant ZenML Pro/Cloud deployments.
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-11876 has been found.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. CVSS score: 5.0/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2026-11876" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-11876 — CWE-862 / CVSS v3 5.0
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack / get_deployed_stack / SqlZenStore
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (CWE-862) has been reported. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions. Attack surface: GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack / get_deployed_stack / SqlZenStore.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.0/10). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
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1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。
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2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stackへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- patch github.com
- web huntr.com
- web github.com