Vulnerability in Sylius (CVE-2026-31824)
Summary
Vulnerability in Sylius (CVE-2026-31824). Data can be tampered with by attackers. Exploitable via PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Sylius is an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony. A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects the promotion usage limit (the global used counter on Promotion entities), coupon usage limit (the global used counter on PromotionCoupon entities), and coupon per-customer usage limit (the per-customer redemption count on PromotionCoupon entities). In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the used counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in OrderPromotionsUsageModifier happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (SET used = 1) rather than an atomic increment (SET used = used + 1), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete requests. All requests pass the usage limit checks and complete successfully, allowing a single-use promotion or coupon to be redeemed an arbitrary number of times. The per-customer limit can be bypassed in the same way by a single customer completing multiple orders concurrent…
Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-31824 has been found in Sylius.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete over the network to misuse the product.
Data can be tampered with by attackers.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Sylius CVE-2026-31824" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-31824 (Sylius) — CWE-362
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (CWE-362) exists in Sylius. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Sylius. Attack surface: PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete.
Severity: ?. Data can be tampered with by attackers.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'Sylius' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'Sylius' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
Syliusを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/completeへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov