SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in ha-mcp (CVE-2026-32111)
Summary
SSRF in ha-mcp (CVE-2026-32111). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /register. Mitigation: upgrade to 7.0.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
ha-mcp is a Home Assistant MCP Server. Prior to 7.0.0, the ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied ha_url and makes a server-side HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive. The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN) is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.
Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-32111 has been found in ha-mcp.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /register over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade ha-mcp to 7.0.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "ha-mcp CVE-2026-32111" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-32111 (ha-mcp) — CWE-918
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /register / ha_url / HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN / provider.py
Patched: 7.0.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in ha-mcp. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /register without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of ha-mcp. Attack surface: POST /register / ha_url / HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN / provider.py.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 7.0.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /register requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'ha-mcp' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'ha-mcp' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
ha-mcpを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /register' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /registerへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade ha-mcp to 7.0.0ステージング環境で 7.0.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /register on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- package github.com