SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in praisonai (CVE-2026-40114)
Summary
SSRF in praisonai (CVE-2026-40114). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via webhook_url. Mitigation: upgrade to 4.5.128 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
The /api/v1/runs endpoint accepts an arbitrary webhook_url in the request body with no URL validation. When a submitted job completes (success or failure), the server makes an HTTP POST request to this URL using httpx.AsyncClient. An unauthenticated attacker can use this to make the server send POST requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, enabling SSRF against cloud metadata services, internal APIs, and other network-adjacent services.
Details
The vulnerability exists across the full request lifecycle:
1. User input accepted without validation — models.py:32:
class JobSubmitRequest(BaseModel):
webhook_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="URL to POST results when complete")
The field is a plain str with no URL validation — no scheme restriction, no host filtering.
2. Stored directly on the Job object — router.py:80-86:
job = Job(
prompt=body.prompt,
...
webhook_url=body.webhook_url,
...
)
3. Used in an outbound HTTP request — executor.py:385-415:
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):
if not job.webhook_url:
return
try:
import httpx
payload = {
"job_id": job.id,
"status": job.status.value,
"result": job.result if job.status == JobStatus.SUCCEEDED else None,
"error": job.error if job.status == JobStatus.FAILED else None,
...
}
async with http…
Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) NVD GitHub Advisory OSV
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-40114 has been found in praisonai.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like webhook_url over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade praisonai to 4.5.128 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "praisonai CVE-2026-40114" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-40114 (praisonai) — CWE-918
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: webhook_url / httpx.AsyncClient / str / metadata.google.internal
Patched: 4.5.128 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in praisonai. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via webhook_url without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of praisonai. Attack surface: webhook_url / httpx.AsyncClient / str / metadata.google.internal.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 4.5.128.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run grep -r 'praisonai' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'praisonai' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
praisonaiを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Apply patch patch
Upgrade praisonai to 4.5.128ステージング環境で 4.5.128 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスを含めること。
-
3Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com