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Medium 6.2

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in @lobehub/lobehub

CVE-2026-42045 First seen on SecPulse

Summary

Cross-site scripting in @lobehub/lobehub (CVE-2026-42045). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via runCommand.

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-42045 has been found in @lobehub/lobehub.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like runCommand over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 6.2/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@lobehub/lobehub CVE-2026-42045" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-42045 (@lobehub/lobehub) — CWE-79 / CVSS v3 6.2
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable)
Attack surface: runCommand / command / window.parent.electronAPI / ipcMain
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

What is the problem

Cross-site scripting (XSS) (CWE-79) exists in @lobehub/lobehub. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via runCommand.

Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @lobehub/lobehub. Attack surface: runCommand / command / window.parent.electronAPI / ipcMain.

Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.2/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

How to fix

Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.

Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run grep -r '@lobehub/lobehub' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposureidentify
    grep -r '@lobehub/lobehub' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で @lobehub/lobehub を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Post-deployment verificationverify
    Confirm patched version is live in production

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed
npm @lobehub/lobehub
≤ 2.1.26
—
Original description The description as published by the source.

LobeHub is a work-and-lifestyle space to find, build, and collaborate with agent teammates that grow with you. Prior to 2.1.48, when LobeChat processes custom tags in the Render process of src/features/Portal/Artifacts/Body/Renderer/index.tsx, if no type match is found, it will choose to call the default method, HTMLRenderer, for HTML rendering. If an attacker can induce the LLM to output content containing malicious tags, an XSS vulnerability can be created on the client side. Additionally, Lobechat's Electron main process exposes an IPC interface called runCommand, used to invoke system commands. This interface allows arbitrary command execution and does not filter the command parameter. Therefore, if an attacker can obtain a handle to window.parent.electronAPI via XSS and call the runCommand method of the IPC, the ipcMain process can execute arbitrary system commands with the current user's privileges. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.48.

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

References

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