SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in magicmirror (CVE-2026-42281)
Summary
SSRF in magicmirror (CVE-2026-42281). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via GET /cors. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.36.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
MagicMirror² is an open source modular smart mirror platform. Prior to 2.36.0, an unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /cors endpoint allows any remote attacker to force the MagicMirror² server to perform arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata services, and localhost services. The endpoint also expands environment variable placeholders (VAR_NAME), enabling exfiltration of server-side secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.36.0.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-42281 has been found in magicmirror.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /cors over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 8.6/10.
What to do: upgrade magicmirror to 2.36.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "magicmirror CVE-2026-42281" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-42281 (magicmirror) — CWE-918 / CVSS v3 8.6
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /cors / process.env / process.env.SECRET_API_KEY
Patched: 2.36.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in magicmirror. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /cors without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of magicmirror. Attack surface: GET /cors / process.env / process.env.SECRET_API_KEY.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.
Update to 2.36.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /cors requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'magicmirror' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'magicmirror' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
magicmirrorを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /cors' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /corsへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade magicmirror to 2.36.0ステージング環境で 2.36.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /cors on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com