Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (CVE-2026-44342)
Summary
Vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (CVE-2026-44342). Data can be tampered with by attackers. Exploitable via GET /api/oauth/email/bind. Mitigation: upgrade to 0.12.0-alpha.1 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
The email and WeChat account binding endpoints used GET requests for state-changing account operations. In deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations, an attacker could trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity.
Affected endpoints included:
GET /api/oauth/email/bindGET /api/oauth/wechat/bind
Impact
A successful attack could change account binding state. For email binding, the attacker could bind an email address they control and then attempt follow-on account recovery flows. The default session cookie configuration uses SameSite=Strict, which mitigates common cross-site navigation attacks in modern browsers, so the issue is rated Medium.
Affected versions
Versions before v0.12.0-alpha.1 are affected.
Patches
This issue is fixed in v0.12.0-alpha.1. The fix changes email and WeChat binding routes from GET to POST and reads parameters from a JSON request body instead of query parameters. The same change set also normalizes password reset responses to avoid disclosing whether an email is registered.
Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to /api/oauth/email/bind and /api/oauth/wechat/bind at the reverse proxy.
Resources
- Fixed by commit
e099117c61391abdf888fb75e382a582e550bd0e. - Relevant code paths:
router/api-router.goand `co…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-44342 has been found in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/oauth/email/bind over the network to misuse the product.
Data can be tampered with by attackers. CVSS score: 5.3/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.12.0-alpha.1 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api CVE-2026-44342" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-44342 (github.com/QuantumNous/new-api) — CWE-352 / CVSS v3 5.3
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated
Attack surface: GET /api/oauth/email/bind / GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind / e099117c61391abdf888fb75e382a582e550bd0e
Patched: 0.12.0-alpha.1 — apply immediately
Workaround: If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to /api/oauth/email/bind and /api/oauth/wechat/bind at the reverse proxy.
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
CSRF (CWE-352) exists in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/oauth/email/bind without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Attack surface: GET /api/oauth/email/bind / GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind / e099117c61391abdf888fb75e382a582e550bd0e.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3/10). Data can be tampered with by attackers.
Update to 0.12.0-alpha.1.
Workaround: If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to /api/oauth/email/bind and /api/oauth/wechat/bind at the reverse proxy.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/oauth/email/bind requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/QuantumNous/new-api' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'github.com/QuantumNous/new-api' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
github.com/QuantumNous/new-apiを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /api/oauth/email/bind' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /api/oauth/email/bindへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply temporary workaround mitigate
If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to `/api/oauth/email/bind` and `/api/oauth/wechat/bind` at the reverse proxy.パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to
/api/oauth/email/bindand/api/oauth/wechat/bindat the reverse proxy. を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。 -
4Apply patch patch
Upgrade github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.12.0-alpha.1ステージング環境で 0.12.0-alpha.1 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
5Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /api/oauth/email/bind on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web security-advisories@github.com