SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in github.com/amir20/dozzle (CVE-2026-45298)
Summary
SSRF in github.com/amir20/dozzle (CVE-2026-45298). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via POST /api/notifications/test-webhook.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. Prior to 10.5.2, in a default dozzle deploy (the documented quickstart, no DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER set), POST /api/notifications/test-webhook is reachable without authentication and forwards an attacker-controlled URL into a WebhookDispatcher that sends an HTTP POST to the supplied URL with attacker-controlled request headers, and returns the response status code AND up to 1MB of the response body to the caller, when the target replies non-2xx. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.5.2.
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-45298 has been found in github.com/amir20/dozzle.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/notifications/test-webhook over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 8.6/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/amir20/dozzle CVE-2026-45298" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-45298 (github.com/amir20/dozzle) — CWE-918 / CVSS v3 8.6
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/notifications/test-webhook / DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER / WebhookDispatcher / input.URL
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in github.com/amir20/dozzle. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/notifications/test-webhook without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/amir20/dozzle. Attack surface: POST /api/notifications/test-webhook / DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER / WebhookDispatcher / input.URL.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/notifications/test-webhook requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/amir20/dozzle' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'github.com/amir20/dozzle' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
github.com/amir20/dozzleを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /api/notifications/test-webhook' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /api/notifications/test-webhookへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /api/notifications/test-webhook on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com