Vulnerability in Ghostfolio (CVE-2026-47127)
Summary
Vulnerability in Ghostfolio (CVE-2026-47127). Data can be tampered with by attackers. Exploitable via GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Ghostfolio is an open source wealth management software. Prior to version 3.4.0, Ghostfolio's Stripe checkout success-URL handler at GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback?checkoutSessionId= retrieves the Stripe Checkout Session by ID and unconditionally grants a Premium subscription to the session's client_reference_id — without ever checking session.payment_status or session.status. There is no separate Stripe webhook endpoint with stripe-signature verification; this callback is the sole code path that creates Stripe-driven subscriptions. Any authenticated user can self-grant a 1-year Premium subscription without ever paying. Version 3.4.0 rejects sessions unless session.payment_status === 'paid' AND session.status === 'complete' (fails closed). Additionally, new unique stripeCheckoutSessionId column → a session can't be redeemed twice (race-safe via DB unique constraint).
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-47127 has been found in Ghostfolio.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback over the network to misuse the product.
Data can be tampered with by attackers. CVSS score: 6.5/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Ghostfolio CVE-2026-47127" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-47127 (Ghostfolio) — CWE-862 / CVSS v3 6.5
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback / client_reference_id / session.payment_status / session.status
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (CWE-862) exists in Ghostfolio. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Ghostfolio. Attack surface: GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback / client_reference_id / session.payment_status / session.status.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5/10). Data can be tampered with by attackers.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'Ghostfolio' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'Ghostfolio' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
Ghostfolioを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callbackへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。