Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in OpenHuman (CVE-2026-49410)
Summary
Vulnerability in OpenHuman (CVE-2026-49410). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via GET /auth/telegram.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Versions before 0.56.0 allow cross-site request forgery against the unauthenticated GET /auth/telegram loopback callback because telegram_auth_handler consumes an attacker-supplied one-time Telegram login token and passes the returned JWT to credentials::ops::store_session without validating browser fetch metadata or the request origin. An attacker with an OpenHuman account can cause a user with the local core running to visit a malicious page that requests the /auth/telegram endpoint on loopback port 7788, switching the user's active local session to the attacker's backend account and exposing subsequent agent actions, memory writes, and Telegram messages associated with that session to the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-49410 has been found in OpenHuman.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /auth/telegram over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 8.1/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "OpenHuman CVE-2026-49410" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-49410 (OpenHuman) — CWE-352 / CVSS v3 8.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated
Attack surface: GET /auth/telegram
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
CSRF (CWE-352) exists in OpenHuman. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /auth/telegram without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of OpenHuman. Attack surface: GET /auth/telegram.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /auth/telegram requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'OpenHuman' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'OpenHuman' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
OpenHumanを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /auth/telegram' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /auth/telegramへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /auth/telegram on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。