SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in phanan/koel (CVE-2026-54494)
Summary
SSRF in phanan/koel (CVE-2026-54494). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via GET /secret. Mitigation: upgrade to 9.7.1 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
Koel's outbound-URL guard App\Helpers\Network::isPublicHost() classifies an IP as "public" using PHP's filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE). That flag set does not recognise IPv6 transition-address forms that embed a private/loopback/link-local IPv4: NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96 (RFC 6052) and 6to4 2002::/16 (RFC 3056). An address such as 64:ff9b::7f00:1 (= 127.0.0.1), 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe (= 169.254.169.254, the cloud metadata endpoint), or 2002:a00:1:: (= 10.0.0.1) is reported as a public address, so the guard returns true and Koel proceeds to fetch the URL.
The guard is the only SSRF defense in front of App\Values\Podcast\EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode(), which downloads a podcast episode with Http::sink($file)->get($url) and streams the response body back to the requesting user. Because an attacker fully controls the `` of any RSS feed they host (and any authenticated user can subscribe to a feed), they can publish an enclosure whose hostname has an AAAA record that is a NAT64/6to4 wrapper of an internal IP. On hosts with NAT64 or 6to4/dual-stack routing (the standard configuration on IPv6-only AWS/GCP subnets and 6to4-relayed networks), the kernel routes the wrapper to the embedded IPv4, and Koel performs a full-read SSRF against the internal endpoint — returning the response body to the attacker.
This is a server-side request forgery with full response disclosure…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-54494 has been found in phanan/koel.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /secret over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade phanan/koel to 9.7.1 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "phanan/koel CVE-2026-54494" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-54494 (phanan/koel) — CWE-918
Attack surface: GET /secret / true / AAAA / PHP
Patched: 9.7.1 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in phanan/koel. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /secret.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of phanan/koel. Attack surface: GET /secret / true / AAAA / PHP.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 9.7.1.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /secret requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'phanan/koel' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'phanan/koel' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
phanan/koelを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /secret' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /secretへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade phanan/koel to 9.7.1ステージング環境で 9.7.1 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /secret on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com