Authentication Bypass in pytonapi (CVE-2026-54635)
Summary
Authentication bypass in pytonapi (CVE-2026-54635). Data can be tampered with by attackers. Exploitable via POST /hook/custom. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.2.1 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
pytonapi is a Python SDK for TONAPI that provides REST API, streaming, and webhook access to the TON blockchain. From 2.0.0 to 2.2.0, TonapiWebhookDispatcher fails to validate the Authorization header when a webhook handler is registered with the documented path argument, because setup() stores bearer tokens only under the default suffix paths and never adds the custom path to the token map, so self._tokens.get(path) returns None and the authentication guard is skipped. An unauthenticated remote attacker can POST forged payloads to the custom webhook endpoint and trigger victim-defined handlers. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.1.
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-54635 has been found in pytonapi.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /hook/custom over the network to misuse the product.
Data can be tampered with by attackers. CVSS score: 7.5/10.
What to do: upgrade pytonapi to 2.2.1 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "pytonapi CVE-2026-54635" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-54635 (pytonapi) — CWE-287 / CVSS v3 7.5
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /hook/custom / Authorization header / TonapiWebhookDispatcher / Authorization
Patched: 2.2.1 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Authentication bypass (CWE-287) exists in pytonapi. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /hook/custom without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of pytonapi. Attack surface: POST /hook/custom / Authorization header / TonapiWebhookDispatcher / Authorization.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5/10). Data can be tampered with by attackers.
Update to 2.2.1.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /hook/custom requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'pytonapi' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'pytonapi' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
pytonapiを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /hook/custom' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /hook/customへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade pytonapi to 2.2.1ステージング環境で 2.2.1 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /hook/custom on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- advisory github.com
- package github.com
- package pypi.org
- patch github.com
- web github.com
- web security-advisories@github.com