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CVE-2026-55066 high CVSS 7.1

Vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api (CVE-2026-55066)

Summary

Vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api (CVE-2026-55066). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.4.0 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

The kanban endpoint POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks
moves a task into a bucket. The task is identified by task_id in the request
body. The endpoint's authorization check (TaskBucket.CanUpdate) only verifies
that the caller may update the project/view/bucket named in the URL — it never
checks any permission on task_id.

Any authenticated user can therefore supply another user's task ID (task IDs are
a global, sequential integer space) against a kanban bucket in their own
project. The server loads that victim task with no authorization check, returns
its full contents in the response, and — when the target bucket is a "done"
bucket — writes to the victim task's row.

This is the same vulnerability class Vikunja has already remediated for task
relations (CVE-2026-33676), task attachments (CVE-2026-33678), task comments
(CVE-2026-33313) and CalDAV task read (CVE-2026-35598). TaskBucket is the
task-child operation that was missed.

Root cause

1. task_id is body-controlled and never permission-checked

pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:32:

type TaskBucket struct {
    BucketID      int64 `... json:"bucket_id" param:"bucket"`
    TaskID        int64 `... json:"task_id"`              // body-bound only — no param tag
    ProjectViewID int64 `... json:"project_view_id" param:"view"`
    ProjectID     int64 `xorm:"-" json:"-" param:"project"`
    ...
}

The web handler `Upda…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-55066 has been found in code.vikunja.io/api.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 7.1/10.
What to do: upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "code.vikunja.io/api CVE-2026-55066" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-55066 (code.vikunja.io/api) — CWE-639 / CVSS v3 7.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks / POST /api/v1/projects/{ATTACKER_PROJECT}/views/{ATTACKER_VIEW}/buckets/{ATTACKER_BUCKE / task_id / TaskBucket.CanUpdate
Patched: 2.4.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-639) exists in code.vikunja.io/api. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of code.vikunja.io/api. Attack surface: POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks / POST /api/v1/projects/{ATTACKER_PROJECT}/views/{ATTACKER_VIEW}/buckets/{ATTACKER_BUCKE / task_id / TaskBucket.CanUpdate.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 7.1/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.4.0.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'code.vikunja.io/api' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'code.vikunja.io/api' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で code.vikunja.io/api を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0

    ステージング環境で 2.4.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go code.vikunja.io/api
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.4.0"}]}]

References

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