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CVE-2026-55496 medium CVSS 4.3

Information Disclosure in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (CVE-2026-55496)

Summary

Vulnerability in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 (CVE-2026-55496). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via GET /api/v4/user/search. Mitigation: upgrade to 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

GET /api/v4/user/search is available to any logged-in user. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address.

A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of inactive and banned accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.

Details

Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)

1. Route — logged-in + UserInfo.Read scope (routers/router.go):

user := v4.Group("user")            // protected user group (login required)
user.GET("search",
    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),
    controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)

The RequiredScopes check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.

2. Service — 2-char keyword to SearchActive (service/user/info.go):

type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"`…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-55496 has been found in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/v4/user/search over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. CVSS score: 4.3/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 to 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 CVE-2026-55496" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-55496 (github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4) — CWE-200 / CVSS v3 4.3
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /api/v4/user/search / GET /api/v4/user/info/ / userClient.SearchActive / StatusActive
Patched: 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

Information disclosure (CWE-200) exists in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/v4/user/search.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4. Attack surface: GET /api/v4/user/search / GET /api/v4/user/info/ / userClient.SearchActive / StatusActive.

🔥 Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.3/10). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/v4/user/search requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'GET /api/v4/user/search' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで GET /api/v4/user/search への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 to 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279

    ステージング環境で 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against GET /api/v4/user/search on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279"}]}]
go github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"}]}]
Go github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}]

References

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