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CVE-2026-58269 high CVSS 8.1

Vulnerability in @sync-in/server (CVE-2026-58269)

Summary

Vulnerability in @sync-in/server (CVE-2026-58269). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via POST /api/auth/token. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.4.0 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Affected component: Sync-in Server v2.3.0, POST /api/auth/token (auth.controller.ts:50-55).

Required attacker capability: Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.

Summary

POST /api/auth/token authenticates with username and password only, then calls getTokens(), which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.

The parallel login endpoint (POST /api/auth/login) correctly enforces 2FA by calling setCookies(user, res, true), which gates on user.twoFaEnabled when server-side TOTP is enabled.

Details

The token endpoint at auth.controller.ts:50-55 uses AuthLocalGuard (password-only) and calls getTokens() directly:

// auth.controller.ts:50-55
@Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN)
@AuthTokenSkip()
@UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard)
token(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise {
  return this.authManager.getTokens(user)
}

getTokens() at auth.service.ts:25-39 signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads user.twoFaEnabled:

// auth.service.ts:25-39
async getTokens(user: UserModel, refresh = false): Promise {
  const currentTime = currentTimeStamp()
  // ...expiration logic...
  return {
    [TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS, accessExpiration),
    [TOKEN_TYPE.REFRESH]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-58269 has been found in @sync-in/server.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/auth/token over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 8.1/10.
What to do: upgrade @sync-in/server to 2.4.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@sync-in/server CVE-2026-58269" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-58269 (@sync-in/server) — CWE-288 / CVSS v3 8.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/auth/token / POST /api/auth/login / POST /api/auth/2fa/login/verify / GET /api/users/me
Patched: 2.4.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-288) exists in @sync-in/server. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/auth/token.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @sync-in/server. Attack surface: POST /api/auth/token / POST /api/auth/login / POST /api/auth/2fa/login/verify / GET /api/users/me.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 8.1/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.4.0.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/auth/token requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@sync-in/server' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r '@sync-in/server' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で @sync-in/server を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/auth/token' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/auth/token への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade @sync-in/server to 2.4.0

    ステージング環境で 2.4.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/auth/token on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

npm @sync-in/server
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.4.0"}]}]

References

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