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CVE-2026-58272 medium CVSS 5.3

Vulnerability in @sync-in/server (CVE-2026-58272)

Summary

Vulnerability in @sync-in/server (CVE-2026-58272). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /api/auth/login. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.4.1 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword():

async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTH_SCOPE): Promise {
  let user: UserModel
  try {
    user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false)
  } catch (e) { ... }
  if (!user) {
    this.logger.warn(...)
    return null   // <-- comparePassword() is never reached here
  }
  return await this.usersManager.logUser(user, password, ip, scope)
}

comparePassword() (backend/src/common/functions.ts) already contains a dummy-hash branch that was clearly added to defend against exactly this class of attack:

export async function comparePassword(password: string, hash?: string | null): Promise {
  if (!hash) {
    // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks
    await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH)
    return false
  }
  return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash)
}

The problem is that this protection only runs when comparePassword() is actually invoked with a falsy hash. Because validateUser() short-circuits with return null as soon as findUser() comes back empty, the "account doesn't exist" path skips all cryptographic work entirely, while the "account exists, wrong password" path always performs a real bcrypt compar…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-58272 has been found in @sync-in/server.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/auth/login over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. CVSS score: 5.3/10.
What to do: upgrade @sync-in/server to 2.4.1 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@sync-in/server CVE-2026-58272" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-58272 (@sync-in/server) — CWE-208 / CVSS v3 5.3
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/auth/login
Patched: 2.4.1 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-208) exists in @sync-in/server. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/auth/login without authentication.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @sync-in/server. Attack surface: POST /api/auth/login.

🔥 Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3/10). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.4.1.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/auth/login requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@sync-in/server' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r '@sync-in/server' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で @sync-in/server を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/auth/login' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/auth/login への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade @sync-in/server to 2.4.1

    ステージング環境で 2.4.1 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/auth/login on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

npm @sync-in/server
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.4.1"}]}]

References

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