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CVE-2026-58416 high CVSS 7.1

Vulnerability in gitea.dev (CVE-2026-58416)

Summary

Vulnerability in gitea.dev (CVE-2026-58416). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.27.0 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

GetActionsUserRepoPermission (models/perm/access/repo_permission.go) decides whether an Actions
task token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator —
except the collaborative-owner branch, which is missing the !task.IsForkPullRequest guard that
its sibling has. As a result, when a private repo B lists owner A as a collaborative owner, an
attacker-controlled fork pull-request workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read
on B — i.e. the fork's YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to.

Details

// models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission
if checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -> denies forks
    return maxPerm, nil
}
...
if taskRepo.IsPrivate {                                   // <-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here
    actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions)
    if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) {
        return maxPerm, nil                              // grants code-read to target repo B
    }
}

The sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs:

func checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool {
    if isForkPR {
        return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories.
    }
    ...
}

taskRepo = the repo…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-58416 has been found in gitea.dev.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 7.1/10.
What to do: upgrade gitea.dev to 1.27.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "gitea.dev CVE-2026-58416" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-58416 (gitea.dev) — CWE-280 / CVSS v3 7.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs / GetActionsUserRepoPermission / taskRepo / repo
Patched: 1.27.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-280) exists in gitea.dev. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of gitea.dev. Attack surface: GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs / GetActionsUserRepoPermission / taskRepo / repo.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 7.1/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 1.27.0.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'gitea.dev' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'gitea.dev' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で gitea.dev を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade gitea.dev to 1.27.0

    ステージング環境で 1.27.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go gitea.dev
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.27.0"}]}]

References

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