Vulnerability in @yeger/turbo-graph (CVE-2026-59160)
Summary
Vulnerability in @yeger/turbo-graph (CVE-2026-59160). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via GET /api/run. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.8.12 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Turborepo Task Execution via /api/run
Summary
@yeger/turbo-graph starts its embedded Next.js server without binding to the loopback interface, causing it to listen on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:29312 by default). The /api/run HTTP endpoint exposed by this server performs no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist check before executing attacker-supplied Turborepo task names via spawn(). Any adjacent-network attacker can send an unauthenticated GET request to trigger arbitrary tasks defined in the victim's repository, resulting in code execution, file modification, destructive build side effects, or deployment of attacker-chosen targets with the privileges of the developer's OS user.
Details
Two independent flaws combine to create a remotely exploitable unauthenticated code execution vulnerability:
Flaw 1 — Server bound to all interfaces (not loopback)
packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts:44 calls .listen(options.port, callback) without passing a hostname argument. Although const hostname = 'localhost' is declared at line 19, it is used only for constructing the console log URL and is never passed to listen(). Node.js therefore defaults to binding on 0.0.0.0 (all IPv4 interfaces) and :: (all IPv6 interfaces), making the server reachable from the local network segment.
// packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts
19 const hostname = 'localhost' // used only for console URL, n…
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-59160 has been found in @yeger/turbo-graph.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/run over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.8/10.
What to do: upgrade @yeger/turbo-graph to 2.8.12 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@yeger/turbo-graph CVE-2026-59160" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-59160 (@yeger/turbo-graph) — CWE-306 / CVSS v3 8.8
Attack vector: adjacent-network / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /api/run / tasks / filter / force
Patched: 2.8.12 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
A vulnerability (CWE-306) exists in @yeger/turbo-graph. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/run without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @yeger/turbo-graph. Attack surface: GET /api/run / tasks / filter / force.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to 2.8.12.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/run requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@yeger/turbo-graph' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r '@yeger/turbo-graph' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
@yeger/turbo-graphを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /api/run' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /api/runへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade @yeger/turbo-graph to 2.8.12ステージング環境で 2.8.12 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /api/run on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。