Path Traversal in @openhop/server (CVE-2026-59179)
Summary
Path traversal in @openhop/server (CVE-2026-59179). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via GET /api/flows/. Mitigation: upgrade to 0.3.6 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Path Traversal in Flow ID File Operations
Summary
@openhop/server passes unsanitized HTTP route parameters directly to path.join() when constructing filesystem paths for flow YAML files. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the server can read arbitrary .yaml files accessible to the OpenHop process outside the configured flow directory, and can delete arbitrary .yaml files at any path reachable by the process. Because CORS is set to origin: true (allow all origins), a victim's browser can be used to exploit the vulnerability against a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments bind HOST=0.0.0.0 by default, enabling direct remote exploitation. CVSS Base Score: 8.3 (High).
Details
FlowStore.filePath() in packages/server/src/store.ts:52–53 constructs a filesystem path by concatenating the caller-supplied id directly into path.join:
// packages/server/src/store.ts:52-53
private filePath(id: string): string {
return join(this.dir, `${id}.yaml`)
}
This result is consumed by two sinks:
- Read (
packages/server/src/store.ts:78):readFile(this.filePath(id), 'utf-8') - Delete (
packages/server/src/store.ts:105):unlink(this.filePath(id))
The id value originates from unauthenticated Fastify HTTP route parameters:
GET /api/flows/:id(packages/server/src/routes.ts:306) →store.get(id)at line 333–335DELETE /api/flows/:id(packages/server/src/routes.ts:509) →store.delete(id)at line 539–541
The…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-59179 has been found in @openhop/server.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/flows/ over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade @openhop/server to 0.3.6 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@openhop/server CVE-2026-59179" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-59179 (@openhop/server) — CWE-22
Attack surface: GET /api/flows/ / DELETE /api/flows/ / GET /api/flows/.. / DELETE /api/flows/..
Patched: 0.3.6 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Path traversal (CWE-22) exists in @openhop/server. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/flows/.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @openhop/server. Attack surface: GET /api/flows/ / DELETE /api/flows/ / GET /api/flows/.. / DELETE /api/flows/...
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 0.3.6.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/flows/ requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@openhop/server' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r '@openhop/server' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
@openhop/serverを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'GET /api/flows/' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
GET /api/flows/への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade @openhop/server to 0.3.6ステージング環境で 0.3.6 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against GET /api/flows/ on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com