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CVE-2026-61628 high CVSS 8.1

Vulnerability in github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition (CVE-2026-61628)

Summary

Vulnerability in github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition (CVE-2026-61628). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via POST /api/users/onboarding/finish. Mitigation: upgrade to 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

POST /api/users/onboarding/finish is registered as anonymous (unauthenticated) and creates a user with full ReadWrite admin permissions. Because the handler uses a check-then-act (TOCTOU) pattern between the "onboarding already completed?" check and the user-creation write, with no atomic guard, a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach an instance in its pre-onboarding state can create an administrator account for themselves — and concurrent requests can create multiple admin accounts in a single race.

Affected component

  • Endpoint: POST /api/users/onboarding/finish
  • Route registration: api/user/routes.go:49 → authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodPost, "/api/users/onboarding/finish")
  • Handler: api/user/onboarding_finish_handler.go

Technical details

The route is explicitly allowed without authentication:

// api/user/routes.go:48-49
authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodGet,  "/api/users/onboarding/status")
authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodPost, "/api/users/onboarding/finish")

The handler reads the onboarding state, returns 403 if already finished, and otherwise creates a user with every permission set to ReadWrite:

// api/user/onboarding_finish_handler.go
func (h onboardingFinishHandler) handle(ctx *gin.Context) {
    alreadyFinished, err := h.commands.OnboardingCompleted(ctx.Request.Context())  // (1) CHECK
    if err != nil { panic(err) }
    if alreadyFinished {
        ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden)…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-61628 has been found in github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/users/onboarding/finish over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.1/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition to 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition CVE-2026-61628" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-61628 (github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition) — CWE-362 / CVSS v3 8.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/users/onboarding/finish / userLoginResponseDTO
Patched: 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-362) exists in github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/users/onboarding/finish without authentication.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition. Attack surface: POST /api/users/onboarding/finish / userLoginResponseDTO.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 8.1/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/users/onboarding/finish requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/users/onboarding/finish' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/users/onboarding/finish への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition to 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab

    ステージング環境で 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/users/onboarding/finish on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab"}]}]

References

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