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CVE-2026-61647

Path Traversal in @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp (CVE-2026-61647)

Summary

Path traversal in @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp (CVE-2026-61647). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /batch-to-vault. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.0.3 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

The vault_batch MCP tool (and the equivalent POST /batch-to-vault HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied vault_dir path that was passed directly to path.resolve() + fs.mkdir() with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write .md / .json answer files anywhere the server process can write.

The slug_prefix parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing / or .. could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.

Impact

File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.

The vulnerability exists from v1.6.0 (when the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the batch_to_vault MCP tool) through v2.0.2.

Patch

Fixed in v2.0.3:

  • Opt-in containment via NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT env var. When set, vault_dir is resolved relative to that root and realpath-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or .. segments outsi…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-61647 has been found in @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /batch-to-vault over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp to 2.0.3 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp CVE-2026-61647" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-61647 (@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp) — CWE-22
Attack surface: POST /batch-to-vault / vault_batch / vault_dir / slug_prefix
Patched: 2.0.3 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

Path traversal (CWE-22) exists in @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /batch-to-vault.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp. Attack surface: POST /batch-to-vault / vault_batch / vault_dir / slug_prefix.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.0.3.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /batch-to-vault requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r '@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /batch-to-vault' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /batch-to-vault への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp to 2.0.3

    ステージング環境で 2.0.3 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /batch-to-vault on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

npm @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.0.3"}]}]

References

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