CoPilotのXSS脆弱性でアカウント乗っ取りの恐れ、0.1.76で修正

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected snapshots preceding the respective 0.1.70 and 0.1.76 sink repairs, portal users, including customer_user, can submit stored markup through POST /api/incidents/db_operations/alert/comment. In customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue, commentHtml replaces newlines in comment.comment but passes the result to v-html without escaping or sanitizing HTML. When another user views the poisoned alert, stored script executes on the application origin; the same unsanitized rendering pattern affects server-stored SOC case, asset and health-check fields in SocCaseNote.vue, SocCaseItem.vue, SocCaseAssetsItem.vue, SocAlertAssetsItem.vue and HealthcheckItem.vue. The authentication store in customer-portal/src/stores/auth.ts persists both access and refresh tokens in JavaScript-readable storage, and customer-portal/src/api/httpClient.ts uses bearer headers rather than HttpOnly cookies. An injected script can steal both tokens, impersonate the viewer and obtain fresh tokens through /auth/refresh. If an analyst or administrator views the poisoned alert or case, this enables persistent privileged account takeover, cross-tenant data access, incident modification or deletion, and detection/response subversion. The health-check sink repair is first contained in version 0.1.70, while the comment and other SOC sink repairs are first…