Code Injection in omnigent (CVE-2026-62674)
Summary
Code injection in omnigent (CVE-2026-62674). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent. Mitigation: upgrade to 0.3.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent checks LEVEL_EDIT permission for a session but does not reject a bound shared or template agent whose agent.session_id is None. An authenticated user with edit access to a session can replace that shared agent bundle through omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py, add a stdio MCP server, and cause later sessions that use the shared agent to launch an attacker-controlled command through omnigent/tools/mcp.py. The command executes with the Omnigent runner process permissions and can expose files, credentials, workspace data, internal services, and runner availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-62674 has been found in omnigent.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 9.0/10.
What to do: upgrade omnigent to 0.3.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "omnigent CVE-2026-62674" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-62674 (omnigent) — CWE-94 / CVSS v3 9.0
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable)
Attack surface: PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent / stdio / LEVEL_EDIT / mcp_servers_editable
Patched: 0.3.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Arbitrary code execution (CWE-94) exists in omnigent. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of omnigent. Attack surface: PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent / stdio / LEVEL_EDIT / mcp_servers_editable.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.0/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.
Update to 0.3.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'omnigent' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'omnigent' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
omnigentを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agentへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade omnigent to 0.3.0ステージング環境で 0.3.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
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4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- patch github.com
- patch github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com