Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in @tinacms/cli (CVE-2026-63123)
Summary
Vulnerability in @tinacms/cli (CVE-2026-63123). Data can be tampered with by attackers. Exploitable via false. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.5.2 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
A browser-based cross-origin request flaw in the Tina dev server allows an attacker-controlled website to cause arbitrary file creation inside the configured media upload directory on a developer machine running tinacms dev. No manual file upload is required. The attacker page builds the multipart request in JavaScript and sends it directly to the local Tina server. The browser blocks access to the response because of CORS, but the server still processes the request and writes the file.
Details
The issue is in the dev server path of @tinacms/cli.
The Vite dev server installs CORS middleware:
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/plugins.ts
server.middlewares.use(
cors({
origin: corsOriginCheck,
methods: ['GET', 'HEAD', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'POST', 'DELETE'],
})
);
For disallowed origins, the origin callback only returns false to the CORS library:
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/cors.ts
return (origin, callback) => {
...
callback(null, false);
};
That does not reject the request server-side. The same request is still routed into the upload handler:
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/plugins.ts
if (req.url.startsWith('/media/upload')) {
await mediaRouter.handlePost(req, res);
return;
}
The upload handler then accepts attacker-controlled path and body data and writes the file:
// packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts
bb.on('file', async (_name, file, _info)…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-63123 has been found in @tinacms/cli.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like false over the network to misuse the product.
Data can be tampered with by attackers. CVSS score: 6.5/10.
What to do: upgrade @tinacms/cli to 2.5.2 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@tinacms/cli CVE-2026-63123" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-63123 (@tinacms/cli) — CWE-352 / CVSS v3 6.5
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated
Attack surface: false / poc.txt
Patched: 2.5.2 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
CSRF (CWE-352) exists in @tinacms/cli. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via false without authentication.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @tinacms/cli. Attack surface: false / poc.txt.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5/10). Data can be tampered with by attackers.
Update to 2.5.2.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run grep -r '@tinacms/cli' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r '@tinacms/cli' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
@tinacms/cliを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Apply patch patch
Upgrade @tinacms/cli to 2.5.2ステージング環境で 2.5.2 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスを含めること。
-
3Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com