SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in magicmirror (CVE-2026-63642)
Summary
SSRF in magicmirror (CVE-2026-63642). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via CHECK_ARTICLE_URL. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.37.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Vulnerability — Blind SSRF via CHECK_ARTICLE_URL (MagicMirror² newsfeed)
Analysis of the PoC
exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js.
Target:newsfeed/node_helper.jsof MagicMirror², socket.io namespace/newsfeed.
Identification
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| PoC file | exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js |
| Endpoint | socket.io namespace /newsfeed, notification CHECK_ARTICLE_URL |
| Precondition | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) |
Description
The checkArticleUrl() function in newsfeed/node_helper.js runs fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" }) with zero validation of the URL and returns ARTICLE_URL_STATUS { url, canFrame }.
This gives the attacker a boolean + timing oracle to map internal hosts and ports: presence, absence, and response time reveal which internal services are alive. It is a "blind-ish" SSRF — the attacker doesn't see the body, but forces the server-side request and observes the effect on the target.
The actual proof is observed on the target side (the server-side HEAD shows up in the internal service's log), since the canFrame field alone leaks little.
Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS
The socket.io server accepts connections from any origin and with no authentication:
const io = new Server(server, {
cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true }
});
The /newsfeed namespace registers the handler without checking who is conne…
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-63642 has been found in magicmirror.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like CHECK_ARTICLE_URL over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade magicmirror to 2.37.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "magicmirror CVE-2026-63642" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-63642 (magicmirror) — CWE-918
Attack surface: CHECK_ARTICLE_URL / canFrame
Patched: 2.37.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in magicmirror. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via CHECK_ARTICLE_URL.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of magicmirror. Attack surface: CHECK_ARTICLE_URL / canFrame.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 2.37.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run grep -r 'magicmirror' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'magicmirror' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
magicmirrorを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Apply patch patch
Upgrade magicmirror to 2.37.0ステージング環境で 2.37.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスを含めること。
-
3Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- package github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com