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CVE-2026-64865

Vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (CVE-2026-64865)

Summary

Vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (CVE-2026-64865). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via PUT /api/user/self. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.0.0-rc.16 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

Authenticated users can repeatedly call PUT /api/user/self with language or sidebar_modules while relay requests are consuming quota. The settings path reads a full User snapshot and writes it back through User.Update(), which refreshes Redis with RedisHSetObj and overwrites the Quota field. This can erase concurrent HINCRBY quota deductions and keep cached balance artificially high, allowing calls far beyond the paid quota.

Impact

A low-privileged authenticated user may bypass quota enforcement and cause financial loss to operators. Authentication and pre-consumption use cached quota, while DB/log usage can continue increasing.

Affected Components

  • controller/user.go: UpdateSelf language/sidebar_modules branches
  • model/user.go: User.Update / UpdateWithTx full snapshot update
  • model/user_cache.go: updateUserCache RedisHSetObj full hash write
  • model/user.go: GetUserQuota reads Redis cache first

Root Cause

Normal billing uses Redis HINCRBY on user:.Quota, while settings updates use a stale full user snapshot to HSET the entire cache hash, including Quota. These two writers race on the same Redis field.

Patches

This issue is fixed in v1.0.0-rc.16. The fix makes user setting updates field-scoped, prevents stale user snapshots from overwriting accounting fields, and keeps generic user cache refreshes from modifying Quota. Quota cache updates are reserved for atomic quota delta paths or explicit quota synchronization paths.

Workarounds

If up…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-64865 has been found in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like PUT /api/user/self over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 1.0.0-rc.16 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api CVE-2026-64865" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-64865 (github.com/QuantumNous/new-api) — CWE-362
Attack surface: PUT /api/user/self
Patched: 1.0.0-rc.16 — apply immediately
Workaround: If upgrading immediately is not possible, operators should temporarily restrict or rate-limit PUT /api/user/self and avoid allowing frequent user setting updates while Redis-backed quota cache is enabled.
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-362) exists in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via PUT /api/user/self.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Attack surface: PUT /api/user/self.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 1.0.0-rc.16.

🛡️ Workaround

Workaround: If upgrading immediately is not possible, operators should temporarily restrict or rate-limit PUT /api/user/self and avoid allowing frequent user setting updates while Redis-backed quota cache is enabled.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual PUT /api/user/self requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/QuantumNous/new-api' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'github.com/QuantumNous/new-api' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で github.com/QuantumNous/new-api を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'PUT /api/user/self' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで PUT /api/user/self への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply temporary workaround mitigate 
    If upgrading immediately is not possible, operators should temporarily restrict or rate-limit PUT /api/user/self and avoid allowing frequent user setting updates while Redis-backed quota cache is enabled.

    パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、If upgrading immediately is not possible, operators should temporarily restrict or rate-limit PUT /api/user/self and avoid allowing frequent user setting updates while Redis-backed quota cache is enabled. を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。

  4. 4
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 1.0.0-rc.16

    ステージング環境で 1.0.0-rc.16 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  5. 5
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against PUT /api/user/self on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.0.0-rc.16"}]}]

References

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