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CVE-2026-65608 high CVSS 8.8

Vulnerability in getgrav/grav (CVE-2026-65608)

Summary

Vulnerability in getgrav/grav (CVE-2026-65608). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.0.7 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

A missing validation check in Grav's Flex framework lets an account holding nothing but an ordinary object-create permission on a single Flex directory execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. Any authenticated user with create or update rights on a Flex-based directory (Flex Users, Flex Pages, Flex Objects, or any custom Flex type) can trigger it the moment a blueprint field anywhere in that directory carries a data-*@: directive, since the code that resolves those directives calls call_user_func_array() on attacker-influenced input with no restriction at all.

This is a bypass of GHSA-fj2p-qj2f-74v5, already patched in 2.0.7. That fix added real validation to Blueprint::dynamicData(), but Grav's Flex system routes the same directive through a separate, unprotected method, FlexDirectory::dynamicDataField(), which never received the same fix.

Details

Grav blueprints support action-property@: directives, YAML keys that tell the blueprint engine to compute a field's value dynamically by calling a function. Blueprint::init() (system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:167-177) resolves these by checking for a registered handler first, and only falling back to the built-in dynamic{Action} method if none is registered:

foreach ($data as $property => $call) {
    $action = $call['action'];
    $method = 'dynamic' . ucfirst((string) $action);
    $call['object'] = $this->object;

    if (isset($this->handlers[$action])) {…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-65608 has been found in getgrav/grav.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.8/10.
What to do: upgrade getgrav/grav to 2.0.7 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "getgrav/grav CVE-2026-65608" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-65608 (getgrav/grav) — CWE-470 / CVSS v3 8.8
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts / GET /blueprints/flex-objects/{type} / create / update
Patched: 2.0.7 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-470) exists in getgrav/grav. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of getgrav/grav. Attack surface: POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts / GET /blueprints/flex-objects/{type} / create / update.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 8.8/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.0.7.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'getgrav/grav' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'getgrav/grav' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で getgrav/grav を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade getgrav/grav to 2.0.7

    ステージング環境で 2.0.7 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/v1/flex-objects/contacts on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

composer getgrav/grav
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.0.9"}]}]

References

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