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CVE-2026-66064 medium CVSS 5.3

Vulnerability in github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 (CVE-2026-66064)

Summary

Vulnerability in github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 (CVE-2026-66064). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via GET /blocked/secret.txt. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

sendFile derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list.

Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass

httpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW req.URL.Path while the file itself is opened from the filepath.Clean-ed path. The two disagree, and a trailing slash makes the derived name the empty string. Both protections key on that derived name, so both are defeated: the rule that never serves the .goshs ACL file, and the acl.Block list.

Measured, with negative controls:

GET /blocked/secret.txt    -> 404          (control, correctly blocked)
GET /blocked/secret.txt/   -> 200 + contents
GET /blocked/.goshs/       -> 200, returns the ACL file itself,
                              including the admin:$2a$... bcrypt hash

Unauthenticated when the ACL is configured block-only (common usage). Stated precisely: AUTHENTICATION IS NOT BYPASSED. An unauthenticated request against a directory protected by authentication still returns 401 under the same trick; I tested that. The claim is specifically that the block list and the ACL-file protection are bypassed. In-tree evidence that sendFile is the defect: the sibling handlers doDir and bulkDownload both derive the name correctly; sendFile is the lone outlier.

Suggested fixes…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-66064 has been found in github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /blocked/secret.txt over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. CVSS score: 5.3/10.
What to do: upgrade github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 to 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 CVE-2026-66064" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-66064 (github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2) — CWE-41 / CVSS v3 5.3
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /blocked/secret.txt / GET /blocked/secret.txt/ / GET /blocked/.goshs/ / sendFile
Patched: 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-41) exists in github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /blocked/secret.txt without authentication.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2. Attack surface: GET /blocked/secret.txt / GET /blocked/secret.txt/ / GET /blocked/.goshs/ / sendFile.

🔥 Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3/10). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /blocked/secret.txt requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'GET /blocked/secret.txt' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで GET /blocked/secret.txt への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 to 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091

    ステージング環境で 2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against GET /blocked/secret.txt on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091"}]}]
go goshs.de/goshs/v2
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091"}]}]
go github.com/patrickhener/goshs
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.1.4"}]}]
go goshs.de/goshs
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.1.4"}]}]

References

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