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CVE-2026-68582 medium CVSS 6.5

Vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api (CVE-2026-68582)

Summary

Vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api (CVE-2026-68582). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks. Mitigation: upgrade to 2.4.0 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

The task-collection endpoint GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a link-share token, the task query is correctly pinned to the share's own project, but the view is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to any project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant's kanban view and receive that view's bucket records — bucket titles plus the full created_by user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike.

Details

Root cause is in TaskCollection.ReadAll (pkg/models/task_collection.go).

  1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check:
// pkg/models/task_collection.go  (ReadAll)
if tf.ProjectViewID != 0 {
    view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params)
    ...
}

GetProjectViewByIDAndProject (pkg/models/project_view.go) filters only on WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ? — it performs no authorization. A valid (project, view) pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist (HTTP 404).

  1. For a link-share caller, the code pins the task scope to…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-68582 has been found in code.vikunja.io/api.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 6.5/10.
What to do: upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "code.vikunja.io/api CVE-2026-68582" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-68582 (code.vikunja.io/api) — CWE-639 / CVSS v3 6.5
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks / POST /api/v1/shares/{shareHash}/auth / GET /api/v1/projects/{B}/views/{V_B}/tasks / created_by
Patched: 2.4.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (CWE-639) exists in code.vikunja.io/api. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of code.vikunja.io/api. Attack surface: GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks / POST /api/v1/shares/{shareHash}/auth / GET /api/v1/projects/{B}/views/{V_B}/tasks / created_by.

🔥 Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 2.4.0.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'code.vikunja.io/api' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'code.vikunja.io/api' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で code.vikunja.io/api を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0

    ステージング環境で 2.4.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  4. 4
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go code.vikunja.io/api
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.24.0"},{"fixed":"2.4.0"}]}]

References

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