SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in open-webui (CVE-2026-70485)
Summary
SSRF in open-webui (CVE-2026-70485). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web. Mitigation: upgrade to 0.11.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 until 0.11.0, Open WebUI checked whether a user-supplied URL destination was globally routable by applying ipaddress.is_global to the literal IPv6 address without examining IPv4 addresses embedded in transition encodings. On a deployment with a NAT64 gateway, any verified user could wrap an internal or cloud-metadata IPv4 address in the NAT64 well-known prefix, pass the filter, and receive the internal response body through RAG URL ingestion, URL-to-markdown conversion, or web-search content retrieval. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.
Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-70485 has been found in open-webui.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 7.1/10.
What to do: upgrade open-webui to 0.11.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "open-webui CVE-2026-70485" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-70485 (open-webui) — CWE-918 / CVSS v3 7.1
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web / ENABLE_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST / _SSRFSafeResolver
Patched: 0.11.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in open-webui. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of open-webui. Attack surface: POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web / ENABLE_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST / _SSRFSafeResolver.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.
Update to 0.11.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'open-webui' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r 'open-webui' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
open-webuiを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/webへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade open-webui to 0.11.0ステージング環境で 0.11.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- advisory github.com
- advisory github.com
- advisory nvd.nist.gov
- advisory github.com
- package github.com
- package pypi.org
- patch github.com
- web github.com