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CVE-2026-73308 medium CVSS 5.7

Information Disclosure in @budibase/server (CVE-2026-73308)

Summary

Vulnerability in @budibase/server (CVE-2026-73308). Confidential information can be exposed externally. Exploitable via GET /api/automations/.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

When an SSO-authenticated user tests an automation in the Budibase builder, their OAuth2 access token and refresh token are included in the automation test results. These results are broadcast via WebSocket to all builders connected to the same dev app and stored in an in-memory cache accessible to any builder who polls the test status endpoint. This allows any co-builder of the same app to steal the testing user's OAuth2 tokens.

Details

The vulnerability exists because getUserContextBindings() intentionally includes OAuth2 tokens in user context bindings (so automations can call external APIs), but the automation test pipeline exposes the full result — including these tokens — to all builders of the same app without sanitization.

Step 1: Tokens included in user bindings

In packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:134-161:

export function getUserContextBindings(user: ContextUser): UserBindings {
  const bindings: UserBindings = {
    _id: user._id,
    email: user.email,
    // ...
  }
  if (isSSOUser(user) && user.oauth2) {
    bindings.oauth2 = {
      accessToken: user.oauth2.accessToken,   // <-- sensitive
      refreshToken: user.oauth2.refreshToken,  // <-- sensitive
    }
  }
  return bindings
}

Step 2: Bindings passed to automation execution

In packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts:311-312:

const user = sdk.users.getUserContextBindings(ctx.user)
return await triggers.externalTrigger(
  { ...a…

Source: GitHub Security Advisories (Global) NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-73308 has been found in @budibase/server.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like GET /api/automations/ over the network to misuse the product.
Confidential information can be exposed externally. CVSS score: 5.7/10.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@budibase/server CVE-2026-73308" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-73308 (@budibase/server) — CWE-200 / CVSS v3 5.7
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable)
Attack surface: GET /api/automations/ / trigger.outputs.user.oauth2 / BuilderSocketEvent.AutomationTestProgress / emitProgress
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

Information disclosure (CWE-200) exists in @budibase/server. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via GET /api/automations/.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @budibase/server. Attack surface: GET /api/automations/ / trigger.outputs.user.oauth2 / BuilderSocketEvent.AutomationTestProgress / emitProgress.

🔥 Severity

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.7/10). Confidential information can be exposed externally.

🔧 How to fix

Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual GET /api/automations/ requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@budibase/server' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r '@budibase/server' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で @budibase/server を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'GET /api/automations/' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで GET /api/automations/ への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against GET /api/automations/ on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

npm @budibase/server
[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.38.1"}]}]

References

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