Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in @novu/js (CVE-2026-75510)
Summary
Cross-site scripting in @novu/js (CVE-2026-75510). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /v1/workflows. Mitigation: upgrade to 3.18.0 or later.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Summary
The @novu/js In-App Inbox renderer passes a notification's redirect.url to window.open() with no URL-scheme validation. The value originates from a notification's call-to-action and is delivered to the recipient verbatim.
An authenticated organization member (or any holder of the environment API key) creates a v1 in-app workflow whose step CTA stores cta.data = { url: "javascript:", target: "_self" }. The v1 message-template cta.data field is a Mongoose Mixed type, so the arbitrary target key is accepted and persisted. The server-side inbox mapper copies cta.data.url and cta.data.target into the notification's redirect object with no scheme check. Novu's v2 control schema validates redirect URLs against redirectUrlRegex (which rejects javascript:), proving the intended invariant; the v1 path and the client renderer do not enforce it.
When the recipient clicks the notification, the inbox calls window.open(url, "_self", "noopener noreferrer"). In Chromium browsers a javascript: URL opened with target="_self" executes in the current document origin (the default _blank is browser-blocked, so the attacker sets _self).
Result: a low-privilege content author runs arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every recipient who clicks, in the origin that hosts the inbox (the customer application or the self-hosted Novu dashboard, neither of which sends a CSP).
Affected
novuhq/novu self-hosted and cloud, API <= v3.15.0; @novu/js <= 3.1…
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-75510 has been found in @novu/js.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /v1/workflows over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: upgrade @novu/js to 3.18.0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "@novu/js CVE-2026-75510" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-75510 (@novu/js) — CWE-79
Attack surface: POST /v1/workflows / POST /v1/inbox/session / GET /v1/inbox/notifications / redirect.url
Patched: 3.18.0 — apply immediately
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) (CWE-79) exists in @novu/js. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /v1/workflows.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of @novu/js. Attack surface: POST /v1/workflows / POST /v1/inbox/session / GET /v1/inbox/notifications / redirect.url.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to 3.18.0.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /v1/workflows requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r '@novu/js' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
grep -r '@novu/js' . | grep -v node_modulesリポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で
@novu/jsを grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。 -
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /v1/workflows' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /v1/workflowsへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Apply patch patch
Upgrade @novu/js to 3.18.0ステージング環境で 3.18.0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。
-
4Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /v1/workflows on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
Affected packages
References
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web github.com
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web github.com