Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3...
Summary
Path traversal reported (CVE-2026-81568). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via product_file_save_name.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via task=download in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath() built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored product_file_save_name, using only JPath::clean() (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject .. segments) and a plain JFile::exists() check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's product_file_save_name ever contained a ../ traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download token/pid pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. configuration.php).
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-81568 has been found.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like product_file_save_name over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "CVE-2026-81568" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-81568 — CWE-22
Attack surface: product_file_save_name / token / pid / configuration.php
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
Path traversal (CWE-22) has been reported. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via product_file_save_name.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions. Attack surface: product_file_save_name / token / pid / configuration.php.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
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1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで影響コンポーネントを特定する。
-
2Post-deployment verification verify
Confirm patched version is live in productionパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- web security@joomla.org
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web j2commerce.com
- web github.com